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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASE NOS. U-18850 & 
U-18940 
COUNTY OF NASSAU, 
Respondent. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, ESQ., GENERAL COUNSEL (JEROME LEFKOWITZ 
of counsel), for Charging Party 
BEE, EISMAN & READY (CATHERINE V. BATTLE of counsel), for 
Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
These cases come to us on exceptions filed by the County of Nassau (County) to 
a decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on two charges, consolidated for 
hearing, filed by the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, 
AFL-CIO (CSEA). Both charges allege that the County violated §209-a.1 (d) of the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it closed the employee cafeteria at 
the Nassau County Medical Center (NCMC) for service or seating between 2:00 a.m. 
and 4:00 a.m. CSEA alleges further in U-18850 that the County also refused to 
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negotiate in violation of the Act when it prohibited unit employees from using personal 
heat-generating appliances, such as microwave ovens, toasters and popcorn makers, 
at their work stations. In U-18940, CSEA alleges that the County improperly changed 
the types and quality of the food given to correction officers assigned to guard prisoners 
undergoing treatment at the NCMC. The ALJ held that the County violated the Act as 
alleged. He found that the County had acted unilaterally with respect to mandatory 
subjects of negotiation without meritorious defense. 
The County argues in its exceptions that the ALJ erred as a matter of fact and 
law in holding that it violated the Act. CSEA argues in response that the ALJ's decision 
is correct in all respects as the record clearly establishes that the County made 
unilateral, indefensible changes in existing practices embracing terms and conditions of 
employment. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' arguments, we affirm the 
ALJ's decision in part and reverse in part. There are no material facts in dispute and 
the ALJ's decision correctly reflects those facts. 
The NCMC cafeteria was open for at least nine years to serve the 200-300 
employees who work the midnight shift at NCMC. The cafeteria served soup, one or 
more hot meals, salads, sandwiches, assorted hot and cold beverages and desserts. 
The County no longer contests whether employee access to a work-site cafeteria is a 
term and condition of employment. The opportunity for employees to enjoy a variety of 
food and beverages within a cafeteria setting at work is both an economic fringe 
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benefit, as it avoids any need for employees to eat and drink off premises at higher 
costs, and it is a matter directly affecting their health, personal comfort and 
convenience.1 
The County argues that by closing the cafeteria during the hours in question it 
eliminated a service to the public, as allowed by its contractual management rights 
clause. That argument is not persuasive because the cafeteria was never a public 
service. The cafeteria at NCMC was intended for employee use only. Although the 
County may not have strictly enforced that policy, use by nonemployees was 
discouraged and such use as there may have been by nonemployees between the 
hours of 2:00 a.m. and 4:00 a.m. was, at most, incidental and infrequent.2 
The County also appears to argue that there was no cognizable change in 
practice because it put in a vending machine and opened a conference room so that 
employees would have a place to eat. The County's substitution of a vending machine 
and a small conference room within which employees could sit is not equivalent to the 
benefits afforded them under a cafeteria operation. The vending machine provides 
neither the variety nor the quality of food prepared on premises and the conference 
room is but a place to sit without the equivalent availability of food or drink. There is 
also substantial question on the record as to whether the conference room is even 
^State of New York (Dep't of Taxation and Finance), 30 PERB 1J3028 (1997) 
(office attire); New York City Transit Auth., 22 PERB 1J6601 (1989) (toilet facilities); City 
of Buffalo, 15 PERB p 0 2 7 (1982) (uniform fabric); Local 294, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 
10 PERB ^[3007 (1977) (seat style in police patrol cars); Scarsdale Police Benevolent 
Ass'n, Inc., 8 PERB fl3075 (1975) (air conditioning). 
2See Buffalo Sewer Auth., 27 PERB 1J3002 (1994) (action incidentally affecting 
public inconsequential in assessing violation). 
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adequate in size to seat comfortably the number of employees working during the 
relevant times. There being no question that the decision to close the cafeteria 
between 2:00 a.m. and 4:00 a.m. was one reached and implemented without any prior 
negotiation, the County's closing of the cafeteria violated §209-a.1 (d) of the Act as 
alleged. 
There is similarly no question that the County unilaterally ordered the removal of 
the personal heat-generating electrical appliances which employees were allowed to 
use at their work stations for many years. Unlike the cafeteria, however, the County's 
prohibition against the use of heat-generating appliances at an employee's work station 
within a hospital is not a term and condition of employment. Although employees' 
opportunity to have hot beverages or food available when they want affects their 
personal comfort and convenience, the inherent nature of such appliances poses 
substantial risks to patient safety, a recognized managerial prerogative.3 Although the 
likelihood of there being a fire, smoke or electrical malfunction caused by the use of 
these appliances may be small, these incidents can occur, and have occurred at 
NCMC, and the consequences are potentially catastrophic. Balancing the employees' 
convenience against the County's right and duty to protect patients' safety while in a 
hospital persuades us that the predominant effect of the County's prohibition is upon its 
) 
3Massena Memorial Hosp., 25 PERB1J3023 (1992); County of Niagara (Mount 
View Health Facility), 21 PERB P014 (1988). 
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mission-related interests.4 As the change did not affect a term and condition of 
employment, the County was privileged to act unilaterally in this regard. 
We find it unnecessary to consider the questions associated with the type or 
quality of food made available to the correction officers assigned to the NCMC. That 
change, to the extent there is any, was precipitated only by the closing of the cafeteria. 
By ordering the restoration of the cafeteria services, any issues in regard to the 
correction officers' food are mooted. 
For the reasons set forth above, the ALJ's decision with respect to the cafeteria 
operation is affirmed and otherwise reversed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the County immediately: 
1. Restore the past practice of providing unit employees working at the NCMC, 
and to the unit correction officers assigned there, the full range of meal and 
beverage options as provided by the County before the cafeteria at NCMC 
was closed between 2:00 a.m. and 4:00 a.m. 
2. Restore the past practice of providing unit employees working at the NCMC, 
and to the unit correction officers assigned there, the use during meal breaks 
of a lounge area equivalent to that provided them before the cafeteria at 
NCMC was closed between 2:00 a.m. and 4:00 a.m. 
3. Make whole any unit employee who, upon a showing of reasonable 
documentary evidence and/or affidavits, incurred expenses for food or 
Whether the use of such appliances in a work setting other than a hospital 
would be a term and condition of employment is an issue we do not decide. 
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beverages, which they would not have incurred but for the elimination of the 
food service operation, until the full range of meal and beverage options, as 
provided by the County when the employees had the use of the food service 
operation in the cafeteria, is made available to unit employees. 
-4.—Sign-and post the attached notice at all work loGations-at-NCMG^ordinarily— 
used to post notices of information to unit employees. 
DATED: January 13, 1999 
Albany, New York 
Michkel R. Cuevas, Chairman 
1arc A. Abbott, Member 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify ali employees represented by the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local ,1000, AFSCME, 
AFL-CIO that the County of Nassau will immediately: 
1. Restore the past practice of providing unit employees working at the Nassau County Medical Center 
(NCMC), and to unit correction officers assigned there, the full range of meal and beverage options as 
provided by the County before the cafeteria at NCMC was closed between 2:00 a.m. and 4:00 a.m. 
2. Restore the past practice of providing unit employees working at the NCMC, and to unit correction officers 
assigned there, the use during meal breaks of a lounge area equivalent to that provided them before the 
cafeteria at NCMC was closed between 2:00 a.m. and 4:00 a.m. 
3. Make whole any unit employee who, upon a showing of reasonable documentary evidence and/or 
affidavits, incurred expenses for food or beverages, which they would not have incurred but for the 
elimination of the food service operation, until the full range of meal and beverage options, as provided 
by the County when the employees had the use of the food service operation in the cafeteria, is made 
available to unit employees. 
Dated By 
(Title) 
COUNTY OF NASSAU 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by 
any other material. 
r- -N STATE OF NEW YORK 
I ] PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CANASTOTA TEACHERS' ASSOCIATION, NYSUT, 
AFT #2536, 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASE NOS. U-18691, 
U-18954 &U-19266 
CANASTOTA CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
HELEN W. BEALE, for Charging Party 
HANCOCK & ESTABROOK, LLP (JOHN F. CORCORAN of counsel), for 
Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
These cases come to us on exceptions filed by the Canastota Central School 
District (District) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) holding that the 
District violated §209-a.1(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it 
appointed nonunit employees to coaching positions that had historically been the 
exclusive work of the employees in the unit represented by the Canastota Teachers' 
Association, NYSUT, AFT #2536 (Association). The Association filed three separate 
improper practice charges. The first, U-18691, alleges that on November 12, 1996, the 
District appointed Vinnie Salamone, who is not in the bargaining unit, to the position of 
Girls Varsity Basketball Coach, a position for which Mark Smith, a teacher in the 
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Association's unit, had applied.1 The Association alleges in U-18954 that the District, 
on March 10, 1997, appointed Vinnie Salamone as Girls Softball Coach, even though 
Smith had applied for that coaching position. In U-19266, the Association alleges that 
on June 24, 1997, the District appointed Joe Fiacchi, who is not in the bargaining unit, 
as Varsity Football Head Coach instead of Smith, who had also applied for that 
position. The ALJ found that employees in the Association's unit had a right of first 
refusal to the coaching positions that established a discernible boundary of exclusive 
bargaining unit work.2 He ordered the District to restore the practice of offering 
coaching positions to eligible unit employees before appointing nonunit personnel and 
that it make Smith whole for any loss of wages or benefits he suffered as a result of his 
not being appointed to the positions of Varsity Girls Basketball Coach and Girls Softball 
Coach for 1996-97.3 
1ln December 1995, Smith had written a letter to the Board of Education, copying 
Superintendent of Schools Sam Tucci and Athletic Director Robert Group, resigning at 
the end of his appointment from the position of Girls Varsity Basketball Coach, which he 
had held for approximately ten years. In his letter, Smith pointed out his various 
concerns with what he saw as a lack of support for sports and a double standard in the 
treatment of different teams on the part of the District. Nonetheless, in September 
1996, he again applied for the position of Girls Varsity Basketball Coach. 
2The ALJ also found that there was no contractual waiver and, because Tucci 
had recommended to the District's Board of Education the nonunit employees for the in-
issue coaching positions, the complained of action was executive, not legislative. The 
District filed no excentions to these findinns. 
3The Head Varsity Football Coach position was filled by a nonunit individual, but 
because another unit employee had also applied for the position and received the 
modified head coach position, and because Smith accepted a coaching position for that 
sport at another school district, the ALJ ordered no back pay. The Association does not 
except to this aspect of the decision and we, therefore, do not reach it. 
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The District excepts to the ALJ's decision, arguing that coaching work is not 
exclusive to the Association's bargaining unit and that back pay with interest should not 
have been ordered for Smith. The Association supports the ALJ's decision. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we reverse the decision of the ALJ. 
The District simultaneously announces coaching positions one or two times each 
year to bargaining unit members, nonbargaining unit employees and employees of 
other districts who have previously coached in the District. While there are more 
teachers in the Association's bargaining unit qualified to coach than there are coaching 
positions, many choose not to coach. As a result, for several years nonunit employees 
have filled certain coaching positions in the District, to which, upon application, they are 
appointed year after year. It appears from the record that, except for the year in 
question, there were no applications made by unit employees for coaching positions 
historically held by another coach, whether a unit employee or a nonunit employee. 
There has only been one instance in the last several years in which a unit employee 
was appointed to a coaching position previously held by a nonunit employee who had 
also applied for the position. On the basis of that one instance, the ALJ found that 
qualified Association unit members have always been appointed to coaching positions 
for which they have applied.4 We disagree. 
4The ALJ also relied upon a letter from the District's previous counsel indicating 
that there was no history of nonunit employees being appointed to coaching positions 
for which a qualified unit employee had applied. For the reasons discussed hereafter, 
that cannot evidence or establish a right of first refusal because there was never a 
situation bringing the alleged right into application. 
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In determining the existence of a past practice, it must be found that the practice 
is unequivocal, has been in existence for a significant period of time and that the 
employees could reasonably expect the practice to continue without change.5 The 
Association has not established that the District has a past practice of always 
appointing a qualified unit member to a coaching position that was either sought or held 
by a nonunit employee because one instance cannot establish an unequivocal past 
practice. That the Association believed that it had a right of first refusal because of that 
one incident does not evidence that such a practice existed or that the District 
acknowledged such a right.6 
The record does not support the Association's contention that nonunit 
employees had held coaching vacancies at its sufferance. To ascertain where the 
Association's case is lacking, we need only look to Board of Education of the City 
School District of the City of Long Beach,7 where the teachers' unit and the District had 
a clear understanding that the District would only hire nonunit driver education teachers 
if no unit employee had sought a position, and the District only solicited nonunit 
employees after it had announced and filled as many vacancies as possible with unit 
^County of Nassau, 24 PERB 1(3029 (1991). See also City of Rochester, 21 
PERB 1J3040 (1988), confd, 155 A.D.2d 1003, 22 PERB H7035 (4th Dep't 1989). 
6 l n oHHi+inn t n ar\r\m i n H n n t h » w a r a n c i p c t n un i t pmn lnudPQ o n r l n n n n n i t 
personnel simultaneously, Group testified that he has never felt himself under any 
obligation to recommend only unit employees. Indeed, he testified that he gives a 
preference to individuals who have previously coached a particular sport in an attempt 
to establish and maintain continuity in the District's athletics program. 
726 PERB 1J3065 (1993). 
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employees. Here, the District solicits unit and nonunit personnel simultaneously and 
characterizes its practice as always hiring the most qualified applicant, whether in the 
unit or not. The one example given of a unit employee being appointed to a coaching 
position previously held by a nonunit employee is equivocal, at best. The unit 
employee may^for-example^have been appointed^not because of-the alleged right of 
first refusal, but because the unit employee was better qualified, in the District's opinion, 
than the nonunit employee. 
Given these circumstances, the Association has not established that it has 
exclusivity over coaching positions in the District under a right of first refusal. 
Therefore, the hiring of nonunit personnel to fill the three coaching positions sought by 
Smith was not an improper assignment of unit work outside the unit and did not violate 
the Act. 
Based on the foregoing, the decision of the ALJ is reversed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED: January 13,1999 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
7A /] ay/*?— 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
JOEL S. AMAKER, SR., 
Charging Party. 
- and - CASE NO. U-18826 
TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION OF 
GREATER NEW YORK, 
Respondent, 
- and -
NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY, 
') " Employer. 
JOEL S. AMAKER, SR., pro se 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by Joel S. Amaker, Sr., to a decision 
of the Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director) 
dismissing his charge that the Transport Workers Union of Greater New York (TWU) 
violated §209-a.2(c) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) by 
misrepresenting him in an arbitration hearing and by refusing to appeal to court the 
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arbitrator's decision.1 Amaker was notified that his charge was deficient and he filed 
amendments to it. Determining that the charge remained deficient, the Director 
dismissed it. 
Amaker asserts in his charge that he filed a complaint of disability discrimination 
with the State of New York - Division of Human Rights in March 1990, complaining that 
the Authority had denied him an appointment to the position of Conductor because of 
disability discrimination. On June 29,1995, Amaker and the Authority entered into a 
stipulation of discontinuance and settlement of that complaint. The Authority agreed to 
appoint him to a permanent Conductor position. Amaker withdrew his Human Rights 
complaint with prejudice and agreed not to bring any future claims against the Authority 
based on its initial refusal to appoint him to a Conductor's position. In October 1995, 
Amaker was appointed as a Conductor. Amaker thereafter filed a grievance in March 
1996 seeking seniority, back pay and benefits from 1990 until the time of his 
appointment as a Conductor. The TWU represented Amaker in the grievance and at 
arbitration. The arbitration award was issued on November 22, 1996, which was also 
the same day as the hearing was conducted. The arbitrator found that Amaker's claim 
was barred by the agreement which settled the Human Rights complaint and denied the 
grievance. 
Amaker claims in his improper practice charge that the TWU failed to require the 
arbitrator to administer an oath or affirmation to the witnesses testifying at the 
1
 Pursuant to §209-a.3 of the Act, the New York City Transit Authority (Authority), 
Amaker's employer, was made a statutory party to the case. 
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arbitration and failed to insist that the proceeding be transcribed or recorded. Amaker 
also claims in his charge that the TWU violated the Act by refusing to appeal the 
arbitrator's decision. In the amendments to the charge, Amaker alleges that the 
collective bargaining agreement between the TWU and the Authority prohibits the 
recording or transcription of an arbitration hearing and thus violates his due process 
rights. With respect to the appeal of the arbitrator's decision, he alleges that the TWU 
has taken "some arbitration decisions to court for similarly situated Union members." 
Amakerwas informed that his charge remained deficient unless he could provide 
specific facts forming the basis for his assertion that the TWU had appealed grievance 
arbitration decisions to court for similarly situated employees. Amaker responded that 
he could not provide the specifics requested, but that PERB should be able to obtain 
such information for him from the TWU and that, in any event, the TWU had 
represented him in a superficial manner at the arbitration hearing. Amaker's charge 
was dismissed by the Director on June 4, 1997, for failing to provide facts which, if 
proven, would support a finding that the TWU violated the Act. 
On July 2, 1997, Amaker wrote to the Director requesting an extension of time to 
"respond" to his decision. His letter was forwarded to Board Counsel and he was given 
an extension of time, to July 16, 1997, to file exceptions to the Director's decision, with 
the admonition that there would be no future extensions granted absent the consent of 
the TWU and the Authority. As discussed infra, no further correspondence from 
Amakerwas received by the Board until August 1998. On November 18, 1997, Amaker 
wrote to the Director requesting that he reopen his case on the basis of a letter, which 
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he had enclosed, from Sonny Hall, International President of the Transport Workers of 
America. In the letter, Hall commented on Amaker's claim that TWU improperly failed 
to appeal the arbitrator's decision, opining that, in most cases, a local union does not 
have the money to appeal an arbitrator's decision but: 
This is not to say that there aren't a few exceptions and that 
a Local Union has risked the cost to fight an arbitrator's 
ruling but they are very, very rare and even in these few 
cases I cannot recall ever winning a court case to overturn 
an arbitrator's decision in relation to a Union member. 
The Director replied that the matter would not be reopened as Amaker had not pled any 
new facts that were unavailable to him at the time he filed his charge. At most, 
according to the Director, Hall's letter could be read as showing that in a few cases the 
TWU had appealed an arbitrator's decision, but that there were no facts alleged which 
would warrant a finding that any of those cases were similar to Amaker's. Amaker then 
spoke to the Director in July 1998, apparently asserting that he had filed exceptions to 
the Director's decision. Amakerwas advised that no exceptions had been received by 
the Board. He then produced a copy of a letter dated July 14, 1997, in which he asks 
for an open-ended extension of time to file exceptions while he searches for evidence 
to support his claims.2 He closes his letter with the direction that he be contacted if 
there are any problems with his request. The letter was not received by this Board until 
August 17,1998, when a copy was provided by Amaker. Amakerwas informed that the 
2The letter bears no return address, no inside address to the Board, and is the 
type Amaker had been using for his 1998 correspondence, a type which is markedly 
different from the type used in his 1997 correspondence with the Director and the 
Board. 
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Board had not received the letter in July 1997, but that his request for an open-ended 
extension would not have been granted in any event because it was for an unknown 
period of time and because it did not comply with the instructions set forth in the letter 
granting Amaker his initial extension of time to file exceptions, specifically, that no 
further extensions of time would be granted absent the consent of the TWU and the 
Authority.3 In response, Amaker raises for the first time that he did not receive 
directions for filing an exception when he received his copy of the Director's decision in 
June1997.4 
In his exceptions, Amaker claims that he thought he had complied with all the 
Board's requirements when he filed his request for a second extension of time to file 
exceptions. He also alleges that he did not receive "the form" needed for filing 
exceptions when he received the Director's decision in June 1997 and, finally, relying 
on Hall's letter, he asserts that he has established that the TWU was arbitrary, 
discriminatory and acting in bad faith when it refused to appeal the arbitrator's 
decision.5 
3Neither the TWU nor the Authority was even copied on Amaker's July 14, 1997 
letter. 
4The Director causes to be enclosed in each decision issued from his section an 
extract from the Rules of Procedure (Rules), §§200-215, setting forth the procedures for 
filing an exception to a decision of the Director or an Administrative Law Judge or a 
judicial appeal of the decisions of this Board. Parties are cautioned in the extract to 
consult the Rules to ensure compliance with all requirements. 
5Neither the TWU nor the Authority responded to Amaker's exceptions. Amaker 
did not file exceptions to that part of the Director's decision that dealt with the TWU's 
representation of him at the arbitration hearing. 
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Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of Amaker's 
arguments, we affirm the decision of the Director. 
Amaker's exceptions are clearly untimely. Whether or not he received the 
excerpt of the Rules provided by the Director as a courtesy, that Amaker had 
information from some source about filing exceptions is established by his timely 
request for an extension of time to file exceptions, which he made to the Director. 
Ignoring the conditions placed upon any future requests for an extension of time, 
Amaker then allegedly wrote to this Board, indicating that he needed an open-ended 
extension, again evidencing some awareness of this Board's Rules regarding 
exceptions. Amaker would not have received an extension of time such as he 
requested. It is clear from this chronology of events that Amaker knew how to file 
exceptions and that he has ignored instructions from both the Director and the Board as 
to how to proceed, electing instead to pursue his case as he saw fit.6 There is nothing 
in Amaker's exceptions which justifies the acceptance of exceptions in this case at this 
late date, and we decline to do so. 
Even were we to consider Amaker's exceptions, it is clear from the materials he 
has filed that he has not pleaded any facts which, if proven, would support a finding that^  
6
 Recognizing that Amaker's appearance before the ALJ and this Board is pro se 
and that some latitude in meeting the requirements of our Rules is warranted in such 
cases, Amaker was afforded the initial extension and his several letters and telephone 
calls were each addressed to ensure that he understood the procedures to be followed. 
Even a pro se litigant, however, must comply with the Rules and instructions from the 
Director or the Board. See Civil Service Employees Assn., Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, 
AFL-CIO, Local 815 (Juszczak), 22 PERB ^3020 (1989). 
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TWU had breached the duty of fair representation. The TWU made a reasoned 
decision not to appeal the decision of the arbitrator, holding that Amaker did not have a 
meritorious grievance based on the agreement that Amaker had signed in settlement of 
his Human Rights complaint. That the TWU, on rare occasions and in undefined 
eireumstaneesyappeals an arbitrators decision does notrsupport a-finding-thatits—— 
decision not to do so in Amaker's case was a violation of the Act. Our decisions have 
always recognized that a union is and must be afforded a wide range of 
reasonableness in making decisions associated with the processing of a grievance, 
including how far it will proceed with a particular grievance or case.7 
Based on the foregoing, Amaker's exceptions are denied and the decision of the 
Director is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED: January 13, 1999 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
'ManfA. Alport, IvfeWiber 
1
 Public Employees Fed'n and State of New York (Dep't of Health), 
29PERBP027(1997). 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-19240 
COUNTY OF NASSAU, 
Respondent. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (JEROME LEFKOWITZ 
of counsel), for Charging Party 
BEE & EISMAN (HOWARD B. COHEN of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA) to a decision by an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing its charge against the County of Nassau 
(County). CSEA alleges that the County violated §209-a.1 (d) of the Public Employees' 
Fair Employment Act (Act) when it unilaterally stopped providing it with a free copy of 
transcripts of the hearings periodically held regarding an employee's eligibility for 
benefits under General Municipal Law (GML) §207-c. 
After a hearing, the ALJ held that CSEA had not proven the practice it claimed. 
The ALJ found that transcripts were provided to CSEA in the past in circumstances 
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falling into two categories. In one category were transcripts provided by or at the 
direction of the GML §207-c hearing officers, whom the ALJ held are not agents of the 
County. In the second category were transcripts CSEA obtained in circumstances in 
which it was unknown from the record how it came into possession of the transcripts. 
As they might have been obtained other than through a County agent, the ALJ held that 
there was a failure of proof as to any past practice. 
CSEA argues in its exceptions that the ALJ erred factually in finding that two 
hearing transcripts were provided by or at the direction of the GML §207-c hearing 
officer. It argues further that actions by the GML §207-c hearing officers were either 
ones taken as agents of the County, or ones resting on at least an implicit recognition 
by them of the practice CSEA alleges to exist. CSEA also argues that the ALJ did not 
give consideration to a statement made by the County's attorney at a GML §207-c 
hearing held after this charge was filed which allegedly admits the practice alleged by 
CSEA. 
The County argues in response that the ALJ's decision is correct or incorrect in 
immaterial respect because there has still been a failure of proof of any change in 
practice even when the record is read most favorably to CSEA. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' arguments, we affirm the 
ALJ's decision. 
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A practice which an employer may not change unilaterally is one embracing a 
term and condition of employment and created by the discretionary acts of its agents.1 
Regardless of the identity of the person serving as a GML §207-c hearing officer, that 
person is required to serve impartially.2 When serving as a GML §207-c hearing officer, 
the person cannot be considered an agent of the employer for purposes of the Act, 
regardless of the employment position that person holds with the County, because the 
hearing officer is not subject to the employer's control. Therefore, we agree with the 
ALJ that any transcripts provided to CSEA by or at the direction of the GML §207-c 
hearing officer, no matter what the reason for the hearing officer's action or directive, 
cannot evidence a County practice. 
Even if the ALJ was incorrect in concluding that the transcripts in two GML 
§207-c proceedings (hearings involving employees Kelley and Chadha) were provided 
by or at the direction of the presiding hearing officer, that would only move the provision 
of those transcripts into the second category, which the ALJ also correctly held did not 
establish a County practice of providing CSEA with transcripts of GML §207-c 
proceedings free of charge. 
It is not enough to hold the County in violation of the Act to find, as the ALJ did, 
that CSEA possessed copies of GML §207-c hearing transcripts without paying for 
them. The controlling question is from whom were those transcripts obtained. As to 
1Section 209-a.1 makes a public employer responsible only for the acts of its 
agents. 
2Curley v. Dilworth, 96 A.D.2d 903 (2d Dep't 1983). 
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that question, it cannot be determined on this record whether CSEA was given the 
* 
transcripts by the County attorney, whether those transcripts were given to CSEA by or 
at the direction of the GML §207-c hearing officer,or whether they were obtained by 
CSEA in some other way. 
—Thastatement attributed tothe County attorney at a-GML-§207-c proceeding 
held after this charge was filed that "from now on we don't supply free transcripts" is 
inconsequential. It cannot be an admission of the practice CSEA claims because the 
County had at least twice before refused to provide CSEA's representatives with free 
transcripts. 
For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the ALJ's decision that CSEA has not 
proven a unilateral change in a past practice regarding the provision of GML §207-c 
hearing transcripts gratis. The ALJ's decision is, accordingly, affirmed and CSEA's 
exceptions are denied. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED: January 13, 1999 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
/ fare A. Xbbott, Member 
. STATE OF NEW YORK 
^ ) PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
PETER ONITIRI, 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-20095 
NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY and 
TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION, LOCAL 100, 
Respondents. 
PETER ONITIRI, pro se 
MARTIN B. SCHNABEL, VICE PRESIDENT AND GENERAL COUNSEL 
(JOYCE RACHEL ELLMAN of counsel), for NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT 
AUTHORITY 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by Peter Onitiri to a decision by the 
Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director) on a charge 
Onitiri filed against his former employer, the New York City Transit Authority (Authority) 
and the Transport Workers Union, Local 100 (TWU), the union representative for Onitiri 
when he was employed by the Authority. Onitiri was dismissed from employment with 
the Authority pursuant to an arbitration award dated September 26, 1996, but one 
perhaps not received by Onitiri until April 1998. Onitiri alleges in his charge that the 
Authority brought disciplinary charges against him twice for the same offense in 
violation of §209-a.1(a) and (b) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act). 
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He alleges that TWU did not represent him in good faith during the grievance/arbitration 
proceedings. 
The Director dismissed the charge as factually and legally deficient. He held that 
the charge was untimely filed and that it set forth no facts to evidence that the 
Authority's disciplinary charges were brought in retaliation for Onitiri's exercise of any 
rights protected by the Act or that TWU's representation was inadequate or in bad faith. 
Onitiri argues in his exceptions that the response he filed to the Director's notice 
of deficiency sufficiently corrected his charge. The Authority argues in response that 
the Director's decision is correct in all respects. TWU has not responded. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' arguments, we affirm the 
Director's decision. 
Even if the charge were timely filed, no improper practice is pleaded against 
either the Authority or the TWU. An employer's discipline of an employee cannot violate 
the cited sections of the Act unless the discipline interferes with or discriminates against 
the employee's exercise of rights protected by the Act. The charge, read most favorably 
to Onitiri, is without even a suggestion that the Authority's disciplinary charges against 
him were brought for any reason which would violate the Act. Discipline, by itself, even if 
it is considered "unfair" upon some standard, does not violate the Act without linkage by 
cause or effect to statutorily protected rights.1 There are no facts in the charge which 
1Green Chimneys Children's Servs., 31 PERB 1J3014 (1998). 
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would evidence that TWU's representation of Onitiri, which continued through 
arbitration, was arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad faith. 
For the reasons set forth above, Onitiri's exceptions are denied and the 
Director's decision is affirmed. 
- ^IT ISr-THEREFOREyORDERED-thatthe-Gharge must be, and-it hereby isT 
dismissed. 
DATED: January 13, 1999 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
u STATE OF NEW YORK PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
- and - CASE NO. C-4736 
TOWN OF DEWITT, 
Employer. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (MIGUEL ORTIZ of counsel), for 
Petitioner 
FERRARA, FIORENZA, LARRISON, BARRETT & REITZ, P.C. (CRAIG M. 
ATLAS of counsel), for Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Town of Dewitt (Town) to a 
decision by the Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director) 
on a petition for certification filed by the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 
1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA). The parties stipulated to the appropriateness of a 
white-collar unit, and two others, except as to the titles of Account Clerk 1 and Data 
Entry Clerk. The incumbents in these titles work in the Town Comptroller's office and 
the Town argued to the Director that they should be excluded from the white-collar unit 
because they are confidential employees within the meaning of §201.7(a) of the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act). 
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After a hearing, the Director held that neither employee is confidential. The 
Director concluded that although the Comptroller is a managerial employee, the two 
employees in that office had not assisted with the negotiation or administration of a 
collective bargaining agreement. Moreover, the Director found that their personnel 
administration functions are restricted to clerical duties and the collection, recording and 
filing of routine information and reports pertaining, for example, to unemployment 
insurance, disability and workers' compensation. 
The Town argues in its exceptions that the employees are confidential based on 
the personnel functions they currently perform for the Comptroller. If not confidential on 
this basis, the Town argues that they should be designated as confidential based upon 
duties which will reasonably be required of them upon CSEA's certification in this unit 
and the two others.1 CSEA argues in response that the Director's decision is correct 
because a confidential designation must be based on duties currently performed and 
neither employee has actually done any work of a confidential nature. Speculation as 
to what either employee's duties might be in the future cannot, CSEA argues, support a 
confidential designation. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' arguments, including 
those at oral argument, we affirm the Director's decision. 
The Town makes two arguments for reversal of the Director's decision, one 
focusing on the current duties of the incumbents, the other on duties which it claims 
1CSEA was certified in November 1998 as the bargaining agent for a unit of the 
Town's supervisory employees and for a separate unit of blue-collar employees. 
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they will perform in the near future given CSEA's certification as the bargaining agent 
for Town employees. We address each argument in order in the context of both the 
Act's controlling definitions and the legislative policies and purposes underlying the 
exclusion of confidential employees from coverage under the Act. 
For purposes of the Act, confidential employees, who are ineligible for 
representation in any unit, are only "persons who assist and act in a confidential 
capacity to managerial employees described in (ii)." Section 201.7(ii) of the Act defines 
managerial employees as ones "who may reasonably be required on behalf of the 
public employer to assist directly in the preparation for and conduct of collective 
negotiations or to have a major role in the administration of agreements or in personnel 
administration 
The exclusions for managerial and confidential employees are an exception to 
the Act's policy to extend coverage to all public employees. The exclusions from the 
Act's coverage for both managerial and confidential employees recognize that an 
employer needs to have a cadre of employees to deliver or assist in the delivery of 
collective bargaining, contract administration or personnel administration services 
whose loyalties will not be conflicted by extending to them the representation rights the 
Act affords other employees. The Legislature's policy statement accompanying 
§201.7(a)2 and the amendments made to that section in relevant part over time3 
21971 N.Y. Lawsch. 503, §5. 
31971 N.Y. Laws ch. 504 and 1975 N.Y. Laws ch. 854. 
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emphasize that the statutory exclusions, whether managerial or confidential, are to be 
read narrowly.4 
The definition of a confidential employee incorporates a two-part test for 
designation. The person to be designated must assist a §201.7(a)(ii) manager in the 
delivery of the duties described in that subdivision.5 Assistance alone, however, is not 
enough to support a designation. In addition, the person assisting the §201.7(a)(ii) 
manager must be one acting in a confidential capacity to that manager. The first part of 
the test is duty oriented, while the second is relationship oriented. As the two parts of 
the test are distinct, satisfaction of one might not satisfy the other. A person assisting a 
manager through the performance of duties confidential in nature is not necessarily one 
performing those duties in a position which has a confidential relationship to the 
§201.7(a)(ii) manager. A person in a confidential relationship to a managerial 
employee might never perform or be expected to perform any of the duties warranting a 
confidential designation. To read the statute in a manner that would have assistance 
with §201.7(a)(ii) functions by itself establish confidential capacity would make the 
words "and act in a confidential capacity to" appearing in §201.7(a) entirely superfluous. 
We do not believe that this is correct as a matter of statutory construction6 or a correct 
reflection of legislative intent. 
^Oisr ripH^inn^ havp oftpn rpritpri thi1^ !pni<5lp,t,'*«i in+ont .Qoo a n .Qfeite nf 
New York, 5 PERB 1f3001 (1972). 
5County of Orange, 31 PERB 1J3016 (1998). 
6N.Y. Statutes §213 (McKinney's 1971). 
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The conclusion that a confidential designation is properly made only upon 
satisfaction of both of two separate conditions is not only consistent with the language 
of the statute as actually written, it is wholly consistent with the Legislature's purpose. It 
is the second prong of the test, in the main, which prevents employers from obtaining a 
confidential designation by assigning duties, even if confidential in nature, to employees 
without regard to the relationship existing between the employee assigned those duties 
and the §201.7(a)(ii) manager. Only this reading of the confidential definition preserves 
the Legislature's intention to have designations made only as reasonable7 and as 
necessary to avoid conflicts of interest. 
Neither employee at issue in this case satisfies both parts of the two-part test for 
confidential status on either of the Town's arguments. 
Although each of these employees currently has duties which assist the 
Comptroller in fulfilling certain of the Comptroller's personnel functions, not all 
personnel work which an employee performs will satisfy the first prong of the 
confidential test. Consistent with the underlying purpose of the exclusion of confidential 
employees from coverage, it is only those personnel functions which present conflicts of 
interest with the employees' representation for purposes of collective negotiations which 
will qualify for confidential designation. Thus, our designations of employees as 
managerial or confidential which have been based upon their personnel functions have 
7The introduction to the specific definitions of managerial and confidential 
employees restricts the designation of either to those which may "reasonably" be made 
periodically. 
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involved situations in which the designees have been exposed in the course of 
performing personnel work to information which has a direct relationship to and impact 
upon collective negotiations and the administration of collective bargaining 
agreements.8 Simple access to existing personnel or financial information, as these 
employees have, is not sufficient for confidential designation9 because the information 
is not of a type which presents any actual or apparent conflicts of interest or clash of 
loyalties. 
Stressing, however, that these two employees are the Comptroller's only 
assistants, the Town argues that it is reasonable to conclude that these employees will 
have to assume duties with respect to collective negotiations and contract 
administration upon CSEA's certification. We find it unnecessary to decide whether 
confidential designations can be based upon duties which may reasonably be required 
of the employees for whom confidential designation is sought.10 Even were we willing 
to reverse existing case law,11 as the Town would have us do, and conclude that 
confidential duties reasonably required of an employee are relevant in considering 
8See, e.g., Bd. ofEduc. of the CitySch. Dist. of the City of New York, 18 PERB 
U3025 (1985); Bd. ofEduc. of the CitySch. Dist. of the City of New York, 6 PERB 
113046(1973). 
9County of Orange, supra note 5; Watervliet Housing Auth., 18 PERB 1J3079 
(1985); Bd. ofEduc. of the CitySch. Dist. of the City of New York, 10 PERB fl3024 
(1977). 
10Managerial designations under §201.7(a)(ii) are permitted to be based upon 
duties which are reasonably required of the manager by the express terms of that 
subdivision. 
"E.g., Somers Cent. Sch. Dist, 14 PERB H3058 (1981). 
Board - C-4736 -7 
whether the "assist" prong of the test for confidential status has been satisfied, nothing 
in this record is persuasive of a conclusion that either employee acts in a confidential 
capacity to the Comptroller. Thus, the second prong of the test is not satisfied even 
upon the Town's alternative argument. 
The second prong of the test for confidential status examines not simply the 
duties performed or to be performed by the allegedly confidential employee, for that is 
the function of the "assist" part of the definition. Rather, the second aspect of the 
definition examines the capacity in which those services are delivered by the employee 
to be designated. The position held by the employee assisting the §201.7(a)(ii) 
manager must be one in a confidential relationship to the position held by the manager. 
The person to be designated confidential must be serving in a position the nature of 
which is one of trust and confidence, vis-a-vis the §201.7(a)(ii) manager. 
There is nothing persuasive on this record to establish that the positions of 
Account Clerk 1 or Data Entry Clerk are in a confidential relationship to the Comptroller 
as might be the case, for example, with a position such as the personal secretary to the 
Comptroller or a personnel assistant. A confidential relationship is not inherent in the 
nature of the two positions themselves nor is it evidenced by the current job 
descriptions for the positions. 
There being no other basis upon which to exclude these titles from the parties' 
stipulated white-collar unit, the Town's exceptions are denied and the Director's 
decision is affirmed. The case is remanded to the Director to determine CSEA's 
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majority status within the white-collar unit the Director found to be appropriate. SO 
ORDERED. 
DATED: January 13, 1999 
Albany, New York 
-Michael-R._Cu.evas, Chairman-
/ M a r c A-Abbott1; Member 
) 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by Arthur Pietraszewski, Jr. to a 
decision by the Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director) 
dismissing his charge against the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 
1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA) to which his employer, the State of New York (State), 
was joined as a party pursuant to §209-a.3 of the Public Employees' Fair Employment 
A _ i / A -vi \ n :_x_, »i—: , i• t u ^ i / ^ o r A . , : _ I _ X i c o n n _ i / ^ \ ~t ± u ~ A ~4- u . . , J „ „ l : „ : . , , * 
rtoi ^A\uij. r ienasz.ew8Ki aneyea men. OOCZAA viuiaieu gz.u»-a./:(C; ui uie rvoi uy ucomii i iy 
to represent him in an age discrimination lawsuit against the State and by refusing to 
reimburse him for the fees he paid an attorney whom he retained to represent him on 
that lawsuit. 
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The Director dismissed the charge as deficient upon his initial review. The 
Director concluded that there were no facts submitted by Pietraszewski to evidence that 
CSEA's decision in either respect was arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad faith. 
Relying upon dictionary definitions of certain words used by the Director in his 
decision and by CSEA's agents in denying his request for legal representation1 and a 
judge's ruling denying the State's motion to dismiss his age discrimination lawsuit, 
Pietraszewski argues that he has offered adequate proof that CSEA breached its duty 
of fair representation. 
CSEA argues in response that the Director's decision is legally correct and 
should be affirmed. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' arguments, we affirm the 
Director's decision. 
CSEA denied Pietraszewski's request for legal assistance because it believed 
from its review of his allegations of age discrimination that his case was "not sufficiently 
meritorious for CSEA to take it on." That Pietraszewski and a judge might disagree with 
CSEA's assessment of the merit of his discrimination allegations does not establish or 
evidence that CSEA's judgment was arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad faith. Just as 
CSEA was privileged to establish a legal assistance program for unit employees, it was 
privileged to determine in good faith when to grant requests for assistance and when to 
deny them. The same wide latitude afforded unions regarding the investigation and 
1
 Pietraszewski offers definitions of "sufficiently", "meritorious", "normally", 
"merits", "predict", and "persuade". 
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processing of contract grievances2 is applicable when a union elects to expand its 
services to unit employees to include legal representation on matters arising outside of 
the collective bargaining context. Nothing in Pietraszewski's allegations or arguments 
evidences that CSEA's denial of his request for legal representation was one made 
otherthan-in good faith. Even if CSEA were in error-regarding the merits of his age 
discrimination allegations, that judgmental mistake would not constitute a breach of its 
duty of fair representation.3 Having properly denied Pietraszewski's request for legal 
assistance, CSEA was not required by the Act to reimburse him for the legal fees he 
paid a private attorney.4 
For the reasons set forth above, the exceptions are denied and the Director's 
decision is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED: January 13, 1999 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
2See District Council 37, AFSCME (Gonzalez), 28 PERB TJ3062 (1995). 
3Smith v. Sipe, 67 N.Y.2d 928, 19 PERB 1J7507 (1986). 
^Public Employees Fed'n (Levy), 31 PERB P090 (1998). 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by Christopher Joseph to a decision 
by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on a charge he fiied against the Amalgamated 
Transit Union, Division 1056, AFL-CIO (ATU), to which Joseph's former employer, the 
New York City Transit Authority (Authority) was added as a party pursuant to §209-a.3 
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of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act). Joseph alleges that ATU 
breached its duty of fair representation in violation of §209-a.2(c) of the Act by 
misrepresenting him at a June 24,1997 disciplinary arbitration which caused an 
arbitrator to dismiss him from employment. 
After a hearing, the ALJ dismissed the charge pursuant to ATU's motion, in 
which the Authority joined. The ALJ found that ATU had not failed to represent Joseph 
at the June 24, 1997 arbitration and that his other allegations concerning ATU having 
made unspecified misrepresentations of fact or its allowing incorrect information to be 
placed into his personnel file were not proven. 
Joseph argues in his exceptions that he did prove that ATU violated the Act. 
ATU and the Authority argue in response that the ALJ's decision is correct and that 
Joseph's exceptions do not raise any factual or legal issues calling the ALJ's decision 
into question. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' arguments, we affirm the 
ALJ's decision. 
The record establishes that Joseph had a history of attendance problems 
resulting in several disciplinary charges and actions, which the ATU successfully 
defended until Joseph was found by the arbitrator to have violated a last-chance 
reinstatement. 
The Authority disciplined Joseph for attendance problems in December 1996. 
Joseph was defended by ATU and he was reinstated by an arbitrator, who subjected 
Joseph to a suspension were he to have future attendance problems. His absence 
from work on December 20, 1996 triggered another disciplinary arbitration, which ATU 
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again defended. Joseph was reinstated conditioned upon his not being late or absent 
from work for the following six months. The arbitrator held that an absence or lateness 
during that period would result in Joseph's discharge. Joseph was late for work within 
the prescribed six-month period. ATU again grieved his dismissal, this time 
unsuccessfully because the arbitrator found that Joseph's lateness was not excusable.1 
Joseph's discharge from employment was the result of his continuing attendance 
problems, not any breach by ATU of its duty of fair representation. Once the arbitrator 
concluded that Joseph's most recent lateness could not be excused, the prior last-
chance reinstatement order left the arbitrator with no alternative other than to allow the 
Authority's discharge to stand. Nothing the ATU did or failed to do at or before the June 
1997 arbitration could change a result dictated under the terms of the arbitrator's earlier 
award by Joseph's own actions. The ALJ's material findings of fact are supported by 
the record and his conclusions of law are correct. There is nothing on the record to 
establish that ATU's representation before, at or after the arbitration hearing was 
arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad faith. As Joseph's timely allegations of impropriety fail 
either as a matter of law or fact, dismissal of the charge at the end of Joseph's case 
was permissible. 
For the reasons set forth above, the exceptions are denied and the ALJ's 
decision is affirmed. 
1The same arbitrator issued all of these awards. 
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IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED: January 13, 1999 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by Nancy Viti to a decision by an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on a charge she brought against her former employer, 
the Sewanhaka Central High School District (District). Viti alleges in this charge that 
she was discharged from employment in violation of §209-a.1(a) and (c) of the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) because she earlier caused an improper 
practice charge to be filed against the District. 
After a hearing, the ALJ dismissed the charge upon a finding that Viti had not 
been discharged because of any protected activity undertaken by her or her union 
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representative on her behalf. Crediting the District's witnesses over Viti, the ALJ found 
that Viti was discharged by the District because it believed her to be a disruptive and 
potentially violent employee who had job performance problems predating her first 
improper practice charge, which was settled without adverse effect upon the District. 
In her exceptions, Viti argues that she was a good employee and that the 
District's representations to the contrary are lies. The District in its response argues 
that the ALJ's findings and conclusions are correct and fully supported by the record. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' arguments, we affirm the 
ALJ's decision. 
The ALJ's decision rests upon his assessment of the credibility of the witnesses' 
testimony regarding the motive for the District's discharge of Viti. The claims Viti makes 
to us were also made to the ALJ, who considered and rejected them based upon his 
credibility findings. The ALJ credited the District's witnesses' testimony as to motive 
and he generally and specifically discredited Viti's testimony as untrustworthy. There is 
no basis in a record that supports the ALJ's credibility determinations to reverse the 
ALJ's findings as to the District's motive. As Viti was not discharged from employment 
for any reason unlawful under the Act, the ALJ correctly dismissed the charge even if 
Viti's actions did not constitute "misconduct" within the meaning of any other statute. 
For the reasons set forth above, the ALJ's decision is affirmed and Viti's 
exceptions are denied. 
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IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED: January 13, 1999 
Albany, New York 
-3 
-Michael R.Cuevas, Chairman 
^ ' Marc A. Abbott, Member 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by Michael J. DePinto to a decision of 
an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing a charge alleging that the Town of North 
Hempstead (Town) violated §209-a.1(a) and(c) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act) when it transferred him to another work location in retaliation for 
his having engaged in activity protected by the Act. DePinto is in a unit of Town 
employees represented by the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 882, 
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Unit 7555, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA). CSEA is also a named charging party, but it 
has not filed exceptions of its own nor joined in DePinto's. 
After a hearing, the ALJ dismissed the charge in its entirety, finding that the 
Town's transfer of DePinto was not in retaliation for the exercise of protected rights and 
-4hat there was no evidence of improper-motivation onJhe part otany Town officials 
involved in the decision to transfer DePinto. Rather, the ALJ determined that the 
transfer was part of the Town's reorganization of its Department of Parks and 
Recreation. DePinto excepts to the ALJ's decision, arguing that it is factually and 
legally wrong. The Town fully supports the ALJ's decision. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' arguments, we affirm the 
) ALJ's decision. 
DePinto has been a Town employee since 1985. From 1994 to 1997, he was 
assigned to Bar Beach, a seasonal beach facility operated by the Town. At Bar Beach, 
DePinto supervised several employees, oversaw the use of Town equipment, had a 
fixed work schedule, the opportunity for overtime and use of a Town vehicle to travel to 
and from work and to travel to unstaffed Town facilities under his supervision. In April 
1997, DePinto was transferred to Fuschillo Park, a year-round facility which includes a 
senior citizen center. His hours vary; there are few, and sometimes no, employees to 
supervise; he has not received any significant overtime opportunities; and he no longer 
has the use of a Town vehicle. 
DePinto points to his election as First Vice-President of CSEA in 1995, his 
-
J
 assumption of the office of Executive Vice-President in 1997, and an increase in the 
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number of grievances and complaints he filed as protected acts which caused the Town 
to transfer him to Fuschillo Park. 
The ALJ's detailed analysis of the record establishes otherwise. In May 1996, 
after DePinto's election as First Vice-President, Parks Commissioner Gerard Olsen 
applied for a promotion for DePintofromGroundskeeperl,a Grade 17 Civil Service 
title, to Groundskeeper II, a Grade 19 title. When that application was denied by the 
Civil Service Commission, Olsen sought and obtained for DePinto a promotion to Labor 
Supervisor II, also a Grade 19 position. During his probationary period , DePinto was 
written up for insubordination by his supervisor, Acting Deputy Commissioner Richard 
Voipe, an action which could have cost him his promotion. The Town, however, merely 
') put a written warning in his personnel file. 
The ALJ fully credited the testimony of the Town's witnesses that the reasons for 
DePinto's transfer were legitimate business concerns, and the record supports her 
findings. In 1997, the Town was faced with a number of retirements and budget 
constraints which limited its ability to fill vacant positions. To address staffing and 
equipment needs, Voipe determined to transfer several employees, including the CSEA 
Unit President and DePinto, and to reassign equipment and duties. Voipe testified that 
other employees, including other supervisors, had complained to him about DePinto's 
control of Town equipment and their difficulties in obtaining the equipment they required 
from DePinto. Voipe further testified that to address aii of these concerns, DePinto was 
transferred, with no change in grade or salary, to Fuschillo Park, a year-round, smaller 
• \ 
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facility with fewer employees to supervise, where he had no control over the use of 
Town equipment by other supervisors. 
DePinto has established the first two elements of a violation of §209-a.1(a) and 
(c).1 Our review of the record shows that DePinto was engaged in protected activities 
and thatthe Town was well aware of his activities. Howeverjt does not support a 
finding that the Town would not have transferred DePinto "but for" his exercise of 
protected rights. DePinto relies on the timing of his transfer, falling as it does during a 
period of increased union activity on his part, to establish this third element of an (a) 
and (c) violation. Timing alone cannot establish this part of the violation.2 Although the 
timing is relevant, the record also shows that during the same time frame, the Town 
twice sought a promotion for DePinto and, in fact, obtained the second promotion for 
him. Additionally, DePinto engaged in insubordination which could have resulted in the 
loss of that promotion, but the Town gave him only a written warning. It is clear from the 
record that neither Volpe nor Olsen harbored anti-union sentiments and that DePinto's 
transfer was part of an overall reorganization involving several employees, including 
another CSEA officer. DePinto's loss of the use of a Town vehicle was a direct result of 
the Town's legitimate plan to reorganize. His loss of some overtime opportunities may 
also be related to his transfer but, on this record, can be equally attributed to a greatly 
^City of Salamanca, 18 PERB 1J3012 (1985). See also State of New York (OMH), 
24 PERB |f3032 (1991); County of Cattaraugus and Sheriff of Cattaraugus County, 
24 PERB 1J3001 (1991). 
2Bd. ofEduc. of the City Sch. Dist. of the City of New York, 14 PERB fl3005 
(1981). 
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reduced need for snow removal during the mild winter of 1997. Given these facts, 
DePinto has failed to establish a violation of §209-a.1 (a) and (c) of the Act. 
Based on the foregoing, the exceptions are denied and the decision of the ALJ is 
affirmed. 
ITISr-TNEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be,andit hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED: January 13,1999 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
MARK A. STEPHENS, 
Petitioner, 
^ a n d - CASE NO. C-4779 
TOWN OF CLARKSON (HIGHWAY DEPARTMENT), 
Employer, 
- and -
CSEA, LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
LOCAL 828, TOWN OF CLARKSON 
EMPLOYEE UNIT, 
Intervenor. 
MARK A. STEPHENS, for Petitioner 
HARTER, SECREST & EMERY (DAVID KRESOCK of counsel), for Employer 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (WILLIAM HERBERT of 
counsel), for Intervenor 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On June 1, 1998, Mark A. Stephens (petitioner) filed a timely petition for 
decertification of the Civil Service Employees Association, Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-
CIO, Local 828, Town of Ciarkson Employee Unit (intervenor), the current negotiating 
representative for employees of the Town of Ciarkson (Highway Department) in the 
following unit: 
Included: All full-time highway department employees including foreman, 
Case No. C-4779 page 2 
mechanics, heavy equipment operators, motor equipment 
operators and laborers. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
Upon consent of the parties, an on-site election was held on December 17, 
1998. The results of this election show that the majority of eligible employees in the 
unifwh^"ca¥fv¥lid~l^ 
collective negotiations by the intervenor.1' 
THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the intervenor be, and it hereby is, 
decertified as the negotiating agent.for the unit. 
DATED: January 13, 1999 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
1/ Of the ten ballots cast, three were for representation and seven against 
representation. There were no challenged ballots. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
OTSEGO COUNTY DEPUTY SHERIFF'S LAW 
ENFORCEMENT ASSOCIATION, 
.. Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4665 
COUNTY OF OTSEGO, 
Employer, 
-and-
OTSEGO COUNTY SHERIFF and OTSEGO COUNTY 
DEPUTY SHERIFFS BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, 
Interveners. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Otsego County Deputy Sheriff's Law 
Enforcement Association has been designated and selected by a majority of the 
employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit found to be appropriate and 
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described below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: Deputy sheriffs, deputy sheriff investigators and security officers. 
Excluded: All non-police officers. _ 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Otsego County Deputy Sheriffs Law 
Enforcement Association. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual 
obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, 
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an 
agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written 
agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party. Such 
obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of 
a concession. 
DATED: January 13, 1999 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SACHEM CENTRAL TEACHERS' ASSOCIATION, 
NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4809 
SACHEM CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Sachem Central Teachers' Association, 
NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO has been designated and selected by a majority of the 
employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties 
and described below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
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Unit: Included: All employees working as Elementary School Classroom Aides, 
Computer Aides and Special Education Aides for more than six 
hours weekly or for at least six hours in one day. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Sachem Central Teachers' Association, NYSUT, AFT, 
AFL-CIO. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at 
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other 
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any 
question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: January 13, 1999 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Petitioner, 
-and-
BEACON CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees1 Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc. 
has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named 
public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
nri(a\/anG«=>S 
Unit: Included: Cook Managers, Cooks and Food Service Workers. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
CASE NO. C-4825 
V > 
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FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc. The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: January 13, 1999 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4826 
BEACON CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc. 
has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named 
public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
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Unit: Included: All full and part-time school related personnel including the 
categories of head mechanic, head custodian, maintenance 
mechanic, custodian, maintenance workers, groundskeepers, 
mechanics helpers, dispatchers, custodial workers, bus drivers, 
classroom aides, nurses aides, library aides, matrons, monitors, 
bus drivers/auto mechanics, school courier and registered nurses 
hired on or after July 1, 1992. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc. The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: January 13, 1999 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED TRANSPORTATION UNION, 
Petitioner, 
.and-. CASE NO. C-4829 
ALBANY PARKING AUTHORITY, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the United Transportation Union has been 
designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named public 
employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their exclusive 
representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Unit: Included: Parking Meter Manager, Garage Manager, Maintenance 
Supervisor, Garage Cashier II, Garage Cashier I, Maintenance 
Worker II, and Maintenance Worker I. 
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Excluded: Executive Director, Operations Director and Finance Director. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the United Transportation Union. The duty to negotiate 
collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in 
good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, 
or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the 
execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by 
either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or 
require the making of a concession. 
DATED: January 13, 1999 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
' 1 M a r c A. ArjDOtfTMember 
